Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member

Lugar, and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity

to update you on our support for comprehensive peace and

stability in Sudan, and on humanitarian issues.

The United States Government has provided more than $6 billion

in assistance to the people of Sudan since the signing of the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. Our overarching goal in

Sudan has always been to help those affected by conflict, and to

establish a just and lasting peace. We have saved lives, and we

have improved conditions for millions of Sudanese, but with less

than 24 months left in the CPA’s roadmap for consolidating peace,

and with the continuing challenges of Darfur, our most critical

tasks lie ahead.

USAID is doing what it can to help support the establishment of

just, accountable, democratic governments that are able to deliver

basic services, whether the people of Southern Sudan and Abyei

choose unity with the North or independence in the 2011 referendum.

However, the time for achieving substantive improvements

in governance is running out, and the critical window during

which we can contribute to genuine transformation via the CPA

roadmap will soon close.

In Southern Sudan, development gains have been slow, and a

recent fiscal crisis has highlighted that many fundamentals of good

governance still need to be established. Infrastructure remains

extremely undeveloped, and the burden is on international donors

to foot the bill. Four years after the CPA’s signing, our collective

contributions are a drop in the bucket of what is needed. But considering

the state of development in the South in the Three Areas

when the war finally ended, our work has just begun, and it will

take decades to cement our progress.

Meanwhile, the situation for the 4.7 million persons affected by

the conflict in Darfur remains intolerable. Although we have managed

to fill many of the gaps left by the expulsion of 13 international

NGOs in March and avert an even greater humanitarian

crisis, these measures are temporary. They rely on temporary staffing

and strain already limited resources. They are not sustainable.

Compounding the situation, carjackings, staff abductions and

assaults, break-ins targeting NGO facilities, and ongoing military

campaigns still impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance to

Darfur. Constant insecurity and violence continue to be the primary

factors limiting the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.

We must institute a sustainable long-term strategy for

Darfur that is finally accompanied by sustainable long-term peace.

We look forward to the day when the 2.7 million persons who

were driven from their homes by this conflict can voluntarily

return safely to their villages. USAID will not deviate from its

responsibility to safeguard the rights and protection of displaced

persons, and we call upon the Government of Sudan to support the

operations of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the

International Organization for Migration so that they can undertake

the vital task of certifying any returns as appropriate and

voluntary.

The violence we’ve seen recently in Darfur, Abyei, and more

recently in pockets of the South, are a jarring symbol of the legacy

of negative trends that developed during Sudan’s conflicts, and persist

to this day: The absence of the rule of law; a dearth of good

governance; an abundance of weapons; and unresolved grievances.

We must strengthen governments’ and communities’ ability to deal

with tension constructively and nonviolently. The alternative is a

failed state, where chaos will reign.

Before concluding, on behalf of USAID I want to express our appreciation

to Senator Kaufman, a member of this committee, who

recently, in a statement on the Senate floor, paid tribute to John

Granville, one of 91 agency employees who have lost their lives in

the performance of their duties overseas. In honor of John Granville

and Abdelrahman Abbas Rahama, USAID is establishing the

Granville-Rahama Staff Care Award, which will recognize USAID

employees who make significant contributions to the morale and

well-being of agency staff.

In addition, the John Granville Secondary School is due to open

this fall in Sudan’s Blue Nile state. John had a special attachment

to the Blue Nile state. And the fact that a school is being built in

his name, with the support and cooperation of the United States

Government, the Sudanese Government, and the Government of

Southern Sudan, is a fitting memorial to a man who dedicated his

life to helping Sudan’s people.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, for giving

me the opportunity to speak on behalf of USAID. We certainly

appreciate your continued dedication to the Sudanese people and

your commitment to peace and stability throughout the continent.

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. Thank you for the

opportunity to update you on the humanitarian situation in Darfur and our support

for comprehensive peace and stability in Sudan. I am pleased to join my colleague,

Special Envoy Scott Gration, on this panel and would like to take this opportunity

to acknowledge the excellent cooperation and coordination between USAID and the

Special Envoy’s office.

The U.S. Government has provided more than $6 billion in assistance to the people

of Sudan since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in

2005. We have helped to stand up a new regional government tasked with rebuilding

and governing the war-torn South. We have conducted wide-ranging civic

education programs and immunized children. We have supported life-saving humanitarian

and peacekeeping operations. We have worked to improve economic opportunities

and public infrastructure. We have provided food aid, and we have supported

Sudan’s farmers and entrepreneurs.

We have saved lives, and we have improved living conditions for millions of

Sudanese.

But with the continuing challenges Darfur and with less than 24 months left to

follow the CPA’s roadmap for consolidating peace, our most critical tasks lie ahead.

The situation for the 4.7 million people affected by the conflict in Darfur remains

intolerable. While we have managed to fill many of the gaps left by the expulsion

of 13 international NGOs in March, these measures are temporary and must be

replaced by a more sustainable, long-term strategy that is finally accompanied by

sustainable, long-term peace. Compounding the situation, carjackings, staff abductions

and assaults, break-ins targeting NGO facilities, and ongoing military campaigns

still impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Darfur and have

resulted in both temporary and permanent suspensions of life-saving programs.

Constant insecurity and violence continue to be the primary factors limiting the

effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Meanwhile, Sudanese expectations that they would benefit from the peace that

came in 2005 remain high—and often unmet. The frustration of many Sudanese is

summed up by what a Nuba man from Southern Kordofan, told a USAID partner

not long ago: ‘‘The peace is now 3 years, and there are supposed to be tangible

things. The government should have expressed its presence; but for us here, there

is no government.’’ The time for achieving substantive improvements in governance

is running out, as the national elections and the referenda on unity draw near. The

critical window during which we can contribute to genuine transformation via the

CPA roadmap will soon close.

As the Special Envoy has noted, the U.S. Government approach to Sudan’s multiple

challenges requires complex and creative solutions, implemented in cooperation

with government officials, tribal leaders, and civil society representatives throughout

Sudan. And it requires us to make a political commitment that matches the

enormous financial and human commitment that we have dedicated to the Sudanese

people over the years.

Even before the Government of Sudan expelled 13 international aid organizations

in March, there were significant assistance gaps across Darfur. The upsurge in

fighting in South Darfur in early 2009, for example, displaced over 30,000 people,

and in February, the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) was unable to reach over

500,000 people in need of food aid.

The NGO expulsion significantly increased the humanitarian challenges and drastically

reduced USAID’s ability to deliver assistance to people in need; both in

Darfur and in the Three Areas.

In Darfur, the expulsions jeopardized food aid to more than a million people and

health services to more than 650,000 Sudanese, according to a March 24 assessment

conducted jointly by the United Nations and the Sudanese Government. More than

half of USAID-funded humanitarian programs in Darfur closed, and 40 percent of

the delivery capacity of our main food aid partner, the U.N. World Food Programme

(WFP) was lost. In just one day, much of Darfur’s humanitarian infrastructure,

which took years to establish and thousands of people to staff, was wiped out.

From the moment the Sudanese Government announced the expulsions, we have

worked with our partners to mitigate the impact. NGOs stocked health clinics and

nutrition centers with months of supplies. WFP conducted a 2-month food distribution

through remaining NGOs and local food committees. To ensure that services

continue, agencies have shifted existing operations, are providing supplemental

assistance, and are relying on community members to provide food, safe drinking

water, health care, and shelter to the most vulnerable people. Remaining NGOs

have scaled up their services and expanded their areas of operation to address gaps

in assistance, and Sudanese Government officials have staffed some health clinics.

We have, so far, averted a greater humanitarian crisis.

However, these measures are merely stopgaps. They rely on temporary staffing

and strain already limited resources. They are not sustainable.

We must focus not simply on the quantitative aspects of filling assistance gaps,

but the qualitative aspects that make programs effective and allow them to continue.

This means ensuring that programs meet technical quality standards, that

they are adequately managed and staffed, and that assistance meets international

norms and standards for humanitarian action. Although immediate gaps have been

addressed through the extraordinary efforts of the United Nations, NGOs still operating

in Sudan, and parts of the government, the expulsion severely impacted the

quality of programming and the ability to accurately monitor the distribution and

impact of assistance. Despite our best efforts, many basic humanitarian needs

remain unmet. Even before the expulsions, NGO access to affected populations in

Darfur was limited and inconsistent. Simply restoring assistance to preexpulsion

levels would still leave many people in need.

In the immediate aftermath of the expulsions, the United States sent a clear message

that the ultimate responsibility for the well-being of the Sudanese people solely

rests on the shoulders of the Sudanese Government. In coordination with USAID,

Special Envoy Gration successfully negotiated with the Sudanese Government to

allow new NGOs to fill gaps in assistance, which is enabling USAID and its partners

to begin the process of rebuilding humanitarian operations. Some new projects

are already underway. These efforts will reintroduce lost capacity and program

quality to Darfur.

However, bureaucratic obstacles and insecurity continue to hamper our efforts to

rebuild the humanitarian infrastructure. The registration of new NGOs has been

time-consuming, and many Sudanese Government commitments remain unmet or

only partially implemented. For example, the Government of Sudan has yet to

return USAID-funded assets that were confiscated from our partner NGOs when

they were expelled.

There has also been a marked lack of progress in enhancing the NGO operating

environment in the Three Areas, where the NGO expulsions significantly altered

the humanitarian, recovery, and development landscape. The expulsion of leading

USAID partners and subsequent seizure of their program assets and equipment

severely undermined the operating environment and has threatened the stability of

these war-torn areas. Due to the unique nature of the Three Areas’ governance systems,

humanitarian programs in the parts of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile controlled

by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) went largely uninterrupted.

However, many assistance programs in Northern-controlled areas were

halted. This dynamic has created an imbalanced distribution of assistance, which

only reinforces conflict lines rather than fostering integration. Although two new

organizations have recently started work in the Three Areas, the current lack of

capacity and loss of confidence among remaining NGOs, coupled with the likely

delays to reestablishing programs now that the rainy season has begun, will further

exacerbate the risk for conflict. The Government of Sudan and the United Nations

have yet to finalize joint communique´s that will formalize operating procedures for

programs in the Three Areas—and which are vital to safeguarding the conduct of

programs in this critical region.

The U.S. Government has worked closely with the Government of Sudan, the

United Nations, other donors, and humanitarian agencies to increase their access

and capacity to address the gaps created by the expulsions. We must continue to

coordinate and engage with these entities to ensure that humanitarian, recovery,

and development programming proceed without impediment, and that aid agencies

are able to operate freely.

We have recently received reports that some of Darfur’s displaced people have

returned home. While we believe that some of these returns are seasonal in nature,

we look forward to the day when the 2.7 million people who were driven from their

homes by this conflict can return safely and securely to their villages. While not all

of them will choose to return home, we are prepared to shift our assistance to support

voluntary returns, and as elsewhere around the world, the international community

will look to ensure that those returns are certified as voluntary by the U.N.

High Commissioner for Refugees or the International Organization for Migration.

We call upon the Government of Sudan to support the operations of these organizations

in Darfur so that they can undertake this vital task. USAID will not deviate

from its responsibility to safeguard the rights and protection of displaced people.

At the same time, we must leverage our coordination and engagement to prepare

for the upcoming historic milestones of holding national elections and referenda on

self-determination for Abyei and Southern Sudan, which could result in the creation

of a new independent country.

The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) did not exist before 2005. Every government

structure and system has had to be crafted from scratch. The committed

men and women who serve in the government are not career politicians, nor have

they benefited from the lessons of a life lived in a democratic, transparent state.

That’s why building the capacity of the GOSS is a cornerstone of USAID’s strategy

in Sudan, and central to the successful implementation of the CPA.

Initially, the GOSS had no offices, no pens, no paper, and no staff to undertake

the most basic tasks needed for a government to function. But with our assistance,

the key GOSS ministries have established systems for hiring people, for formulating

budgets, and for establishing office systems. This has required tremendous dedication

on the part of GOSS officials, who have been willing to roll up their sleeves

and persevere through each one of these processes.

Considerable progress has been made in establishing functioning institutions

where there previously were none. Ministries are functional, revenue is coming in,

payments are being made, and a legal framework is being built. But development

gains have been slow, and a recent fiscal crisis has highlighted that many fundamentals

of good governance need to be improved. International NGOs are still the

primary providers of basic services. Few roads have been paved and other infrastructure

remains equally underdeveloped. Government at every level still needs to

forge stronger, more consistent linkages between policy priorities and development,

legislation, and budget capacity. High expectations for tangible benefits of peace

remain unmet, especially in communities most affected by the war, where tensions

and instability continue to threaten progress. Episodes of clan violence, as well as

violence committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army along the border with the Democratic

Republic of Congo, have increased, taking scores of lives in recent weeks

alone.

To bolster investments in strengthening the Government of Southern Sudan,

USAID has launched a program that enhances the ability of local governments to

provide peace dividends, defuse conflict, and promote stabilization in the Three

Areas and key Southern states. USAID also played a key role in a joint donor—

GOSS compact to strengthen the government’s fiscal responsibility and financial

management, representing a renewed commitment and redoubled cooperation to

deliver the peace dividends promised by the CPA. We all are seeking to help support

the establishment of a just, accountable, democratic government able to deliver

basic services, whether the people of Southern Sudan and Abyei choose unity with

the North or independence in the 2011 referendum.

And we cannot speak of the CPA without noting the precarious footing of elections.

Elections were designed to be a central component of the broader strategy to

transform Sudan democratically under the CPA, and our support to the national

election process remains firm. But the hurdles are daunting.

As you likely know, the date for elections has been pushed back several times

from the CPA-mandate of July 2009. While the postponements were intended to

allow for adequate preparation, ongoing delays pose increasing risks. Just 9 months

remain until the designated polling date, yet there is no public budget for the elections.

The electoral law—which establishes an electoral system that would be highly

complicated, even in countries with a long democratic tradition—was passed more

than 2 years after the deadline specified in the CPA. The National Election Commission

(NEC) still hasn’t fully established its 26 subsidiary commissions throughout

the country, nor has it received its full operating budget. In addition, the failure

to resolve technical questions related to Northern census data spurred key Southern

political leaders to reject the census results, making the use of those results to delimit

electoral constituencies highly sensitive. Finally, the logistical and political

challenges of implementing credible elections in Darfur cannot be understated. Massive

civic and voter education will be required to engage Darfur’s displaced people

and the vast populations in the South that have low levels of literacy and little or

no experience with past elections.

So, given the current status of election preparations, are our expectations too

high? Do we believe it is too late to have credible elections in Sudan? No. It is too

early to predict whether or not these elections will be credible, when so many

administrative decisions are outstanding. Until key decisions are made, the ability

of our central election administration program to move forward as intended will be

severely limited. However, our programs to increase civic participation and observe

the entire electoral process will continue, in coordination with the National Election

Commission. We are coordinating with the United Nations and other international

partners to bolster a credible outcome to this daunting but historic election for

Sudan.

Before concluding, on behalf of USAID, I want to express our appreciation to

Senator Kaufman, a member of this committee, who recently in a statement on the

Senate floor, paid tribute to John Granville, one of 91 agency employees who have

lost their lives in the performance of their duties overseas.

In honor of John Granville and Abdelrahman Abbas Rahama, USAID is establishing

the Granville-Rahama Staff Care Award, which will recognize USAID employees

who make significant contributions to the morale and well-being of agency

staff. Our staff work in some of the most difficult, dangerous environments in the

world, and the tragedy of John and Abdelrahman’s deaths reminded us of how

important it is to promote a caring work environment and to help our staff cope

with stress in the workplace.

In addition, the John Granville Secondary School is currently under construction

and due to open this fall in Sudan’s Blue Nile State. John had a special attachment

to Blue Nile, and the fact that a school is being built in his name with the support

and cooperation of the U.S. Government, the Sudanese Government, and the Government

of Southern Sudan is a fitting memorial to a man who dedicated his life

to helping Sudan’s people.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to speak on behalf of

USAID. We certainly appreciate your continued dedication to the Sudanese people

and your commitment to peace and stability throughout the continent.

Thank you for your question, Senator. You’re absolutely

right. When we lost 13 NGOs during the expulsion, we lost

our capacity and the international capacity to support gender-based

programs, including prevention of violence and how to deal with

gender-based violence.

What we are doing now is working with existing NGOs on the

ground to expand their capacity so that they can expand the women’s

programs into other areas. It’s slow in coming back. In fact,

if one were to look at the various sectors that we lost when the

NGOs were expelled, that is probably the slowest one in coming

back onstream. But it is critical, and is something that we’re very

mindful of.

One important part of our program, especially in the

South, is education, and education by radio. The newest shift in

our assistance now is civic education, and getting prospective voters

ready for elections over the next year—over next 8 to 9 months.

So, voter education and civic education are critical components.

And obviously a lot of people in the South don’t have access to

schools, and so, we’re—we have devised radio instruction programs.

Senator KAUFMAN. Great. Is that the sum and substance of it, in

terms of communications? That’s it. In other words, basically—

what we’re basically doing is trying to educate folks in preparation

for the elections.

And general civic education programs, and education

programs.

We do have preposition of stocks. The rainy season is

coming up. However, we’ve had experience, over the last 4 or 5

years, in how to operate in the environment. We—as the General

mentioned earlier, a number of the interventions that we’ve had to

take, the international community—mainly WFP and ourselves—

are not fully sustainable. And so, with regard to food assistance,

there are some things that aren’t sustainable. For example, instead

of relying on NGOs to deliver food, and being able to monitor that,

we’re relying on local relief committees. And so, we’re trying to

analyze the impact that the rainy season will—might have on the

local relief committees that are distributing aid.

Thank you for your question, Senator. Earlier we did

have a discussion of women’s issues, especially in Darfur. And

you’re absolutely right, if there were good, effective, fuel-efficient

stoves, it would reduce the exposure of women outside of the

camps.

What we have found, though, is some of the early models that

we have of fuel-efficient stoves, they haven’t been living up to their

promises. They’ve oversold them. They’re not as efficient as they

led us to believe. So, we are now working on a study to help identify

ways of improving them so that we come up with a better

design and a stove that truly is fuel efficient and energy efficient.

It’s in progress now. And I can’t give you, with any

definition, when it will be concluded, but we will certainly work

with you and your staff on that.

Absolutely.

When we refer to ‘‘unsustainability,’’ what we’ve done

is, we’ve had to ask actors to take on roles that they’re not used

to doing. And so, it means that they’re not implementing programs

that meet acceptable international standards.

I mentioned, for example, the delivery of food aid. We have a

monitoring element—monitoring element—built in all along the

way. We can’t do that now. We don’t have the resources.

The Government of Khartoum can facilitate that ability

to do it better by doing what it is doing now, and that is——

Technical agreements——

Absolutely. And now——

The problem is—excuse me, Senator——

The problem is—of course, is rebuilding that capacity.

There is—we talked about all the progress that the government

has made, and that is in issuing technical agreements, in issuing

visas, not requiring travel permits. The one area that they have not

fully implemented is the return of assets. And so, assets that were

seized, post-March 4, they have not been returned, for the most

part.

We are rebuilding capacity, and we’re rebuilding capacity to a

point where we’ll have full sustainability and greater coverage than

we did prior to March 4. And we’re doing that by expanding the

presence of existing NGOs. Eight NGOs were currently expanding

their programs. They will be able to bring in more international

staff, hire more local staff. And then the General also mentioned

four NGOs that are coming back to Sudan, three of which will work

in Darfur.